

OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR 8803A FACULTY GUIDE SUPPLEMENT

PART I 7 March 2005

All instructors are required to read the 8800 Program Faculty Guide found at the Marine Corps College of Continuing Education faculty development Web site. Once you have read that document, you are prepared to engage in this course.

Course 8803A is organized in the same manner as all 8800 "Alpha" courses. The course introduction provides an overview of the purpose of the course and some administrative instructions. Following the course introduction are the lessons themselves. Each lesson begins with a brief introduction designed to set the stage for the remainder of the lesson material. One or a series of student requirements follow this introduction.

Underneath each requirement is listed one or more educational objectives. These objectives should become the focus of effort for each student studying the lesson. The supporting required readings, listenings, and/or viewings are listed beneath these objectives. After the student reads, listens to, or views the required materials, he or she should then read the remaining material found in the course book for that requirement for the purpose of tying together some of the readings to the educational objectives or for providing additional information not found within the required readings. This information is important, as are the readings, listenings, and viewings.

In order to pass the examination, each student must read and understand what is specified within each requirement. Each lesson concludes with a brief lesson summary and a listing of the joint professional military education (JPME) learning objectives found within the lesson. The coverage of these objectives provides the basis for the student's JPME Phase I certification.

This 8803A faculty guide is comprised of two parts. Part I contains faculty material for Lessons 1-7 while Part II contains material for the remaining seven lessons.

This faculty guide supplement is organized by lesson, requirement, and educational objective. Under each educational objective are listed key points germane to the objective. Also listed below each objective is a reference to a test question (item) or a series of test questions that support that objective. These objectives should be the focus of your seminar and any discussions that you facilitate. On some occasions, additional questions that directly apply to the educational objectives are provided for your use in seminar.

The 8803A course is a long and involved course. Most students will be unfamiliar with the operational level of war and this course will be their first exposure to it.

Campaigning, joint warfare, information on the uniformed Services, and war termination are topics of discussion and study in this course. Additionally, woven throughout the course is the OPERATION DESERT STORM case study using the Gordon-Trainor book, *The Generals' War*. This case study should provide you ample material and opportunity to clearly and adequately convey to your students the concepts, attributes, and techniques, of war at the operational level. This guide is designed to provide you with a starting point for your preparation for each seminar.

Table of Contents Part I

LESSON 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR	1
LESSON 2: INTRODUCTION TO OPERATION DESERT STORM CASE STUD	Y5
LESSON 3: INTRODUCTION TO JOINT WARFARE	12
LESSON 4: ORGANIZATION OF JOINT FORCES	19
LESSON 5: CAMPAIGNING AND THE OPERATIONAL ART	27
LESSON 6: INTRODUCTION TO FORCE DEPLOYMENT PLANNING AND EXECUTION.	50
LESSON 7: INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR.	58


LESSON 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

Requirement 1

Objective 1. Understand the linkages between strategy, the operational level of war, and the tactical level of war. [JPME Area 2(a), 3(a)(e), 4(c)]

Exam Items 1 and 2 apply.

- The operational level of war is defined by JP 1-02 as:
 - The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas.
 - Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.
 - These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics.
 - They ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces.
 - They provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.
- The following graphic demonstrates this definition of operational level of war.




Linkages between the Strategic and Operational Levels of War (Jablonsky)

- Strategic guidance is the link between the highest level of war and the operational commanders.
 - Strategy provides for political end state and objectives necessary for the development of operational objectives and concepts.

- Ideally, the strategic ends, ways, and means provided to the operational commander should allow him to achieve a positive result without serious fighting.
 - The interdependence between the strategic and operational levels of war is more apparent in the matter of means or resources, particularly since military strategy in the modern era has become increasingly more dependent on logistics than, say, the 18th century.
- Strategic objectives must be aligned with the necessary resources that can accomplish those objectives. Several miss-alignments can exist.
 - Strategic objectives loftier than resources available (example: Hitler during WWII).
 - No strategic objectives and plenty of resources (example: Vietnam).
- Operational concepts must be designed to achieve political and strategic objectives.
- Political objectives as well as the operational instrument are linked inextricably to the other part of the Clausewitzian trinity-the national will.
- Constraint and restraints are placed on commanders at the operational level of war.
 - Complicating the harmonization of ends, ways, and means is the fact that strategic guidance is heavily influenced by international and domestic policy.
 - Commanders at the operational level should consistently examine the effects of such constraints and restraints.
 - Dialogue between the players at the strategic and operational levels must exist.
 - As in 8802A, Bolf, Drew, and Snow stated there must be a give and take kind of feedback mechanism between national policy and those executing that policy...grand strategy therefore, is the bridge between the two.
 - A negative example of this dialogue is MacArthur during the Korean conflict.
- Strategic influence on the commander at the operational level (See the following diagram).
 - Field Marshal Slim wrote, "A higher commander must think big."
 - Commander must deal with strategic goals that require him to focus on broad but decisive operational objectives extended over time and space beyond the tactical realm.
 - Broad objectives mean broad vision.
 - It is the process of interacting with the strategic level, directly or derivatively, that causes the commander to form his unique perspective.
 - Major problem can occur when the operational perspective becomes so narrow or selfabsorbed that there is a strategic disconnect.

INTERACTIONS OF THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL COMMANDER




- Clausewitz stated, "A prince or a general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and his resources, doing neither too much nor to little."

Linkages between the Tactical and Operational Levels of War (Bolt & Jablonsky)

- General Glen K. Otis, former Commander, U.S. Army in Europe has stated the relationship between the operational and tactical levels of war very well when he says,
 - "At the operational level...your goal is not to kill the enemy, but to provide opportunities for the commander at the tactical level to kill the enemy. You operational objective is to put the enemy in harms way."
- The unique spatial perspective of the operational commander causes him to transcend the more detailed terrain appreciations of the tactical level.
- In war at the operational level, it is essential to relate what is strategically desirable to what is tactically possible with the forces at your disposal.
- Tactics make the steps from which operational leaps are assembled; strategy points out the path.
- Commanding at the operational level of war attempts to deal with a series of tactical actions over much more greatly expanded parameters. Decision making at this level is based, to a great extent, on forecasting with an uncertain vision.

- Operational synchronization is the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space, and purpose to **produce** maximum relative combat power at the decisive point.
- In order for a commander at the operational level of war to operate in the disorder and confusion of Clausewitz's fog of war, he must create an effective balance between centralization and decentralization, conformity and initiative, and authority and individual responsibility.
 - Key to balance is formulation of commander's intent and the clear understanding of that intent by subordinate commanders.
- Doctrine, joint, and combined operations, and sustainment are all facets of the operationaltactical interface.
- Today, there are those who argue that the combatant commander is no longer a translator of strategic objectives, since the operational and tactical levels of war have, in essence, become subsumed into the strategic level of war (see the following diagram).
 - With access to information so pervasive throughout all military operations (be it on the battlefield or in the halls of the Pentagon), it is now argued that even a **tactical** action by any military member can have strategic results.



LESSON 2: INTRODUCTION TO OPERATION DESERT STORM CASE STUDY

Requirement 1

Objective 1. Using the Gulf War as your example be able to explain the link between the national objectives in support of military objectives and the importance of a clearly defined conflict termination. [JPME Area 3(d)(e)]

Exam Item 3 applies.

Objective 2. Comprehend how the U.S. military was organized within the CENTCOM framework to conduct Joint and multinational operations at the operational level of war. [JPME Area 1(b)(e), 3(a)]

No exam questions.

Objective 3. Comprehend how CINCCENT planned for the defensive phase of the impending Gulf War prior to a complete buildup of U.S. and Coalition forces. [JPME Area 2(b), 3(a), 4(d)]

No exam questions.

The following material pertains to Objectives 1, 2, and 3.

Note: The educational objectives of this lesson will be accomplished over this entire course. Gordon and Trainor's book, *The Generals' War*, will be the primary source for our case study of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The first reading from the Joint Military Operations Historical Collection is designed to give the student a broad overview of Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The Gordon-Trainor book allows you and the student to achieve greater resolution on the pros and cons of how this war was fought within the greater context of the operational level of war and joint warfare.

- This lesson introduces to the student the case study of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The purpose of this case study, which is threaded through the entire course, is to provide a common set of examples and situations to reinforce the various lessons within 8803A. Included in this case study are the positives and the negatives of the operation, which can be viewed from the lens of each lesson within this course.
- Iraqi occupation of Kuwait began on 1 August 1990 after a significant Iraqi army build-up along the Iraq-Kuwaiti border.
- 11 Iraqi divisions were either in or deployed to Kuwait by the 6th of August.
 - This meant Iraq had more than enough forces for occupation; threat now was to Saudi Arabia
 - Iraqi forces positioned along Kuwait-Saudi border with additional Iraqi forces entering Kuwait

- Three avenues of approach into Saudi Arabia concerned U.S. officials:
 - Approach along the Gulf coast on high-speed roads leading into Saudi Arabia's most critical ports and coastal facilities.
 - Approach from central Kuwait into Saudi Arabia by-passing much of the restrictive terrain near coastal roads but with the same objectives in mind, ports and coastal facilities
 - The third and most unlikely approach was toward the Saudi capital of Riyadh.
- U.S. national policy objectives:
 - Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
 - Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government.
 - Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf.
 - Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.
- Military objectives of Operation DESERT SHIELD:
 - Develop a defensive capability in the Gulf region to deter Saddam Hussein from further attacks.
 - Defend Saudi Arabia effectively if deterrence failed.
 - Build a militarily effective Coalition and integrate Coalition forces into operational plans.
 - Enforce the economic sanctions prescribed by UNSC Resolutions 661 and 665.

The Generals' War: Chapter One, War by Miscalculation

- Iraq had eyes for Kuwait for a long time.
 - o In 1961 Iraq claimed sovereignty over Kuwait, but the British had sent in troops before Iraq could take over Kuwait, averting war.
- A 1979 study recommended the U.S. make clear that it was prepared to respond to Iraqi aggression with military force and to quickly intervene in any potential crisis before it either began or escalated (much as the British did in 1961).
- Early in 1990 U.S./Iraqi relations began to deteriorate. Iraq's behavior was faltering, but U.S. did not have a new policy of containing Iraqi power or treating Iraq as a threat.
- July 1990, Iraqi foreign minister charged that Kuwait's refusal to resolve the border disputes, its refusal of Iraqi demands that its debt be canceled, and its insistence on pumping oil in excess of OPEC quotas were tantamount to military aggression.
- July 21, Republican Guard began arriving in Basra.
 - o DIA, Walter Lang, was concerned, but superiors discounted Iraq's moves as a bluff.

- July 25, Allen, CIA National Intelligence Officer for Warning, issued a warning of war, 60% chance of attack.
 - Central Command drew up list of steps U.S. could take to signal its determination to defend the Gulf:
 - Flexible deterrent options (FDOs): Send carrier; maritime prepositioning ships; F-15s to Saudi Arabia; or B-52s to Diego Garcia.
 - However, moderate Arab states making encouraging statements about the prospect of a diplomatic resolution the recommendations were not accepted.
 - U.S. did take one small step: UAE requested KC-135s to support Mirage 2000s. This was done.
 - o This got Saddam's attention; he summoned U.S. ambassador for private meeting to discuss our exercises with UAE.
 - o Glaspie accentuated the positive about broadening U.S.-Iraqi relations but U.S. still questioned Iraqi saber rattling with Kuwait.
 - o Saddam got a call from Egypt and agreed to talk with Kuwait to try and resolve the problems.
 - o Glaspie recommended to the President to ease off of public criticism of Iraq to see how the negotiations develop.
- July 28, U.S. sent a moderate presidential message welcoming Saddam's encouraging statement about seeking a peaceful solution to tensions.
 - It did not warn the Iraqis that an attack on Kuwait would be viewed as a threat to U.S. vital interests in the region.
 - Pentagon was not pleased; they wanted a firmer position on what would happen if Iraq did attack.
 - Many in the administration and Arab countries felt that negotiations would solve the problems.
- July 31, Talks broke down.
- 1 August, CIA, Allen, issued warning of attack, 70% chance, DIA went to WATCHCON I the highest level of alert.
 - Nothing yet had been done to strengthen U.S. military position.
- Administration policy.
 - Bush Administration's two basic assumptions:
 - Iraq was a punch-drunk fighter who was tired of war and needed a respite to rebuild after the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq would continue to update its arsenal, but diplomatic coercion and subversion would be its primary levers of power, not war.
 - Saddam Hussein's behavior could be moderated through diplomacy and by encouraging American companies to become involved in rebuilding Iraq. Normal relations between the U.S. and Iraq would serve U.S. longer-term interests and promote stability both in the Gulf and the Middle East regions.

- Mistakes
 - Fundamental mistake was the U.S. failure to understand the explosive relationship between the deteriorating Iraqi economy and its oversized military.
 - Iraq's deteriorating economy created an incentive for it to keep its military strong to enable it to bully its neighbors into reconstructing Iraq's economy.
 - Reducing the military size would strain the economy further by expanding the worker pool, increasing unemployment.
 - Problem was not the effort to moderate Iraqi behavior as it was with the failure to make clear the costs of Iraqi aggression.
 - U.S. did not flex muscles early as 1979 study had recommended and as the British had done in 1961.
 - Failure to act on available information.
 - U.S. committed to its diplomatic policy for too long and did not see Iraq's war preparations for what they were.

Objective 4. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of deployed U.S. military forces as organized in order to fight both a defensive and offensive campaign in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operation (KTO). [JPME Area 1(a)(b)]

Objective 5. Understand the joint and combined command structure as established by CINCCENT prior to STARTEX in the KTO. [JPME Area 1(d)(e), 3(c)]

No exam questions.

The following material pertains to both Objectives 4 and 5.

- The joint and combined command structure of U.S. Central Command:
 - Army Component Central Command (ARCENT).
 - Commanded all Army forces in theater, other than those attached to other components.
 - During Operation DESERT SHIELD, ARCENT commanded XVIII Airborne Corps, VII Corps and echelon-above corps units providing logistics, intelligence, air defense, and other support.
 - Marine Corps Component Central Command (MARCENT).
 - o Commanded all Marine forces in Saudi Arabia.
 - o Tactical headquarters was I MEF.
 - Marines afloat were fell under the Navy component, Central Command (NAVCENT).
 - Central Command Air Force Component (CENTAF).
 - o Commanded all U.S. Air Force units in theater.
 - Assigned airspace control authority and the joint force air component commander (JFACC).

- Special Operations Command, Central Command (SOCCENT) retained operational control (OPCON) of all special operations forces in theater while Service components provided administration and logistics to those same forces.
- Coalition forces were placed in a command structure which allowed close coordination between U.S. and other nations' military forces.
 - UK forces OPCON to Commander CENTCOM while remaining under UK command.
 - French operated independently under national command but coordinated closely with Saudis and CENTCOM.
 - Islamic forces operated under Saudi control.
 - Informal planning group structure formed between Saudi controlled forces and CENTCOM.
 - Later a Coalition Coordination, Communication, and Integration Center C3IC was formed under ARCENT lead.

The Generals' War: Chapter Two, Drawing the Line

- After the Attack: The afternoon following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the civilian leadership was looking for a way to roll back the Iraqi gains while the military leadership was urging caution.
- Iraqi attack used cream of army.
 - Republican Guard.
 - Special operations forces.
 - Armored and mechanized divisions.
 - Helicopters carried special forces directly to Kuwait City while commandos made an amphibious landing from the Gulf.
 - Meanwhile, a second Republican Guard armored division swept south below the Gulf of Kuwait to dispose of remaining Kuwaiti resistance; considered impressive performance even though negligible resistance.
- Secretary of Defense Cheney's perspective after attack
 - Thought Persian Gulf important; didn't want Saddam Hussein occupying Kuwait and sitting astride the Gulf oil supply.
 - Attack would give Baghdad political influence, if not outright physical control over the Saudi oil flow.
 - Didn't want to just stop the Iraqis, but reverse the invasion. He felt that to permit
 aggression sends the wrong signal to despots that superpower competition had created
 power vacuums.
 - o Iraq with Kuwait oil could confront Israel and create Middle East War.
- CJCS, General Powell's perspective.
 - A more limited task of defending Saudi Arabia.
 - Felt Iraqis would withdraw troops and that American public would not support a war to force them out.
 - o Saddam will put a puppet in charge of Kuwait.

- American public doesn't want their young dying for \$1.50 a gallon oil.
- Tell the Iraqis that loss of Saudi Arabia was unacceptable and pressure the Saudis to let U.S. forces in.
- Didn't want to launch air strikes from distance to defend Saudis (wanted troops on the ground in Saudi Arabia).
- Opposed to dramatic action without the President having popular support.
- Secretary of State Baker's perspective.
 - Plan was for the U.S. and the Soviet Union (Iraq's longtime patron and arms supplier) to issue a joint declaration condemning the attack.
 - o Protect American lives in Kuwait.
- President Bush's perspective.
 - o Immediately froze Kuwait's financial assets.
 - Pushed an urgent resolution through the UN Security Council demanding unconditional withdrawal of Iraq troops.
 - Inclined to take the tough line; rollback, not containment was his bottom line.
- Deputy Defense Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's perspective was the same as Cheney's (see above).
- Saudi Arabians (Prince Bandar, Saudi ambassador to U.S. and King Faud) perspective.
 - Bush said that if U.S. forces were sent to Saudi Arabia, the U.S. would go all the way.
 - o Saudi Arabia would not be abandoned.
 - Cheney authorized to show Bander CENTCOM's plan.
 - Powell informed Bander that a massive ground presence was envisioned (100,000 troops).
- Schwarzkopf and CENTCOM perspective.
 - Schwarzkopf possessed violent temper; perceived as either bully or warrior.
 - Diverse background in airborne, infantry, and mechanized infantry.
 - Multiple staff jobs where he acquired sponsor, Gen Vuono, COS of Army.
 - Helped him become head of Central Command.
 - CENTCOM started as old Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force under President Carter to combat Russians.
 - Converted under Reagan to a permanent command on equal footing with European and Pacific commands.
 - o Did not oversee Israel.
 - o Had only a planning headquarters in Tampa, FL.
 - o Had no forces assigned (borrowed forces under other geographic commands).
 - No one in senior leadership expected Schwarzkopf and his "bastard" command would end up leading a shooting war.
 - Schwarzkopf's main challenge for CENTCOM was to acquire political allies (Cheney) and a new foe abroad (protecting the Persian Gulf oil supply).
 - Assumed a 22 division Iraq threat and 21 days of warning.

- CENTCOM was trying to craft a three-phase plan to deter, defend, and go on the offensive to seize lost ground when war broke out.
- Planned a war game to simulate Iraq attack called *Internal Look*.
- At start of war, command had only a rudimentary idea of how to set up ground defenses and a limited notion of how to use air power.
- List of forces to be deployed had not been updated.
- Intelligence was a problem.
- Only way to get defense in place before Iraqi forces swept into Saudi Arabia was to send U.S. forces into theater before Saddam attacked..
- Post-attack impressions.
 - Schwarzkopf impressed with number of Iraqi divisions and tanks.
 - Iraqis took Kuwait in four days, rather than the projected seven.
 - Repulsing invaders would depend on Iraqi's ability to manage logistics and U.S. warplane killing power.
 - Thought it would take a month to get a defense in place.
 - Estimated an offense to expel Iraq from Kuwait would take 6-8 months.
 - President wanted an offense to expel Iraq.
 - Saudi Arabia reluctant to accept the deployment of U.S. troops.
 - U.S. sent a negotiation team of Cheney/Gates/Schwarzkopf with Bush's message that he wanted Iraqis out of Kuwait.
 - While diplomatic negotiations were going on, a delay occurred in activating the Marines' maritime prepositioning ships (MPS).
 - Meant only lightly armed paratroopers were on the ground at a critical time early in the war (key lessons learned).
 - Iraq had five armored, two mechanized, and four infantry divisions in Kuwait (not enough to invade Saudi Arabia, but worrisome).
 - Iraqis sent patrols to probe the Saudi Arabian border on three occasions.
 - Cheney told Saudi Arabia that unless they agreed to deployment of U.S. forces to their soil, Saudi Arabia risked becoming another Kuwait.
 - King Fahd agreed to receive the troops.
 - President Bush got go ahead to launch the deployment.
 - Cables sent to American embassies in overfly countries before State Department officially announced going to war (key lessons learned).
 - Operation named DESERT SHIELD.
- In a matter of days, Washington had laid the foundation of a military and political strategy to defend Saudi Arabia and wrest control of Kuwait.
- Powell was not successful in heading off talk of an offensive operation to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait.
- Immediate problem was not liberating Kuwait, but protecting Saudi Arabia.
- Schwarzkopf's next step was to manage logistics and set up an effective command and control system.

LESSON 3: INTRODUCTION TO JOINT WARFARE

Requirement 1

Objective 1. Understand the fundamentals of Joint warfare. [JPME Area 1(a)(b)(e), 2(a)(b), 3(a)(c)(d)(e), 4(e)]

Exam Item 4 applies.

Objective 2. Understand how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war. [JPME Area 3(b)]

Exam Item 5 applies.

Objective 3. Understand the primary command and control structures used in Joint and multinational operations. [JPME Area 1(b)(c), 4(c)]


No exam questions.

The following material pertains to Objectives 1, 2, and 3.

- Review some of the concepts of the 8802A course, Strategy and Policy, such as the following. This will assist your students, by placing joint warfighting in the proper context.
 - JSPS.
 - The National Security Council.
 - JPEC
 - Instruments/elements of national power.
- Joint warfare is team warfare.
 - War is a human undertaking that does not respond to deterministic rules.
 - The following are values of joint warfare.
 - Integrity: The foremost value and is the cornerstone for building trust.
 - Competence: Is at the core of the profession of arms.
 - o Physical courage: Defines warriors.
 - o Moral courage: The willingness to always stand up for what is right.
 - Teamwork: An absolute must in operations pulling together individual uniformed Services.
- The bedrock of U.S. military doctrine are the nine principles of war (Appendix B of JP 1).
 - Objective.
 - Offense.
 - Mass.

- Economy of force.
- Maneuver.
- Unity of command (Guiding principle for the exercise of joint command).
- Security.
- Surprise.
- Simplicity.
- The following are the fundamentals of joint warfare:
 - **Unity of effort**: All undertakings or efforts directed toward the achievement of common aims.
 - **Concentration**: The U.S. Armed Forces should strive to operate with overwhelming force, based not only on the quantity of forces and material committed, but on the quality of their planning and skill of their employment.
 - **Initiative**: All military actions should be conducted with offensive spirit, exploiting the full leverage of all available forces to confuse, demoralize, and defeat the enemy.
 - **Agility**: Agility is relative to the enemy but is characterized as the ability to move quickly and easily.
 - **Extension**: When militarily advantageous, operations should be extended to the fullest, breadth and depth feasible given political, force, and logistic constraints.
 - **Freedom of action**: Effective diplomatic, economic, military, and informational instruments of power are needed to provide the freedom to act at the national level. Adequate robust logistics support, information technology, deception, and force structure all contribute.
 - **Sustainment**: Strategic and theater logistics capabilities, deployment concepts, logistics standardization, deployment and redeployment procedures, and interoperability are a few key factors enhancing sustainment.
 - **Clarity**: Due to the complexity of the modern battlefield, plans and operations need to be kept as simple as possible, while using common terms and procedures communicated in one language.
 - **Knowledge**: Knowledge of oneself from the more holistic perspective. In other words, know your forces and how they mesh with the joint force in total. Knowledge of the enemy in terms of understanding their centers of gravity (COGs) is the key to aligning friendly forces to attack those enemy attributes most vulnerable to us.
- Naturally, military power or force is merely one instrument of national power. Considerations for using this element are found below:
 - Advances national interests.
 - Clearly defined and achievable mission.
 - Clearly stated end state, termination conditions, and exist strategy.
 - Decisive means available.
 - Campaign plan showing path to success.
 - Milestones to measure success.
 - Alternate courses of action if military unsuccessful.

- National and international agencies ready for their roles.
- Support of allies, friends, and international institutions.
- Support of American people.
- JP 1 lists several enduring concepts for conducting joint military operations. Also listed are those enduring enablers that enable the application of those concepts. These do not need to be memorized only understood. They are listed below in the following graphic.



- JP 1 also briefly discusses the elements of joint operational art. This and campaigning are covered in detail in Lesson 5. Also discussed in JP 1 are interagency and multinational operations. These segments are good primers and will expose the student to new material that will be covered in much greater detail in course, 8806A, Warfighting...from the Sea: Joint Warfighting.

Requirement 2

Objective 4. Comprehend the changes presented in Joint Vision (JV) 2020 that will affect the U.S. Armed Forces in the 21st century. [JPME Area 1(e), 5(d)]

Objective 5. Comprehend the four operational concepts JV 2020 is built upon. [JPME Area 2(b), 5(d)]

Exam Item 6 applies to both objectives.


The following material pertains to both Objectives 4 and 5.

- *Joint Vision* is currently rolled-up into the U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) and the Joint Operating Concept (JOC). At the time of printing this course, *Joint Vision 2020* was the existing concept for joint operations. Modifications have currently been made. The JOC is still in draft form as of the publication date of this faculty guide supplement. Full spectrum dominant still remains a current concept. The operational concepts listed in the following graphic have been transformed into similar concepts within the JOC.
- Full spectrum dominance is defined by JV 2020 as the ability of U.S. forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations.
- Full spectrum dominance (FSD) is defined by the NMS of 2004 as the overarching concept for applying force today and provides a vision for future joint operations. Achieving FSD requires the Armed Forces to focus transformation efforts on key capability areas that enhance the ability of the joint force to achieve success across the range of military operations. FSD requires joint military capabilities, operating concepts, functional concepts and critical enablers adaptable to diverse conditions and objectives.
- The operational concepts listed by JV 2020 are listed and described in the following graphic.




JV 2020 Operational Concepts

- The major differences between JV 2020 and 2010 are:
 - More focus on multinational and interagency interoperability.
 - Information operations is highlighted as a critical element of full spectrum dominance.
 - Joint command and control receives increased focus.
 - Information superiority leads to decision superiority.
 - MOOTW receives greater emphasis.
 - DOTMLPF (see below) innovation instead of technological innovation.



JV 2020

- The following graphic shows the evolution of "jointness, American style" and where we are now, in terms of joint, multinational, and interagency operations.



Objective 6. Comprehend how Joint warfare evolved and was practiced during Operation Desert Storm. [JPME Area 2(b), 4(d), 5(d)]

Exam Item 7 applies.

The Generals' War: Chapter 3, Crossed Swords

- Schwarzkopf forced into quick defense with few forces. His solution was to create impression that Saudi Arabia was well defended until the heavy reinforcements arrived.
 - Combat troops arriving in theater looked good on TV but deployment initially was essentially a bluff; no logistics.
 - Force needed to arrive fast enough to fight but heavy enough to survive.
- First troops to arrive.
 - The 2nd Brigade of Army's 82nd Airborne.
 - First ground troops to Saudi.
 - Job of protecting airfields, ports.
 - o 24 F-15s from Langley AFB with logistics, communication gear.
 - AWACS radar AC from Tinker AFB: provided continuous air surveillance.
 - o Aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower sent to Red Sea.
 - USS Independence sent to Gulf of Oman.
 - Navy ships w/cruise missiles.
- Saudis seemed more apprehensive w/foreigners performing military exercises than with Iraqi Republican Guard troops at their border.
- Logistics: CENTCOM Achilles heel, logistics took a back seat to new technology.
 - Sealift: Low priority.
 - 8 SL7 fast sealift.
 - 72 ready reserve fleet activated.
 - U.S. paid high prices for commercial ships to help with sealift.
 - Cargo by air.
 - Civilian requisition program: 20% of cargo, 64% troop transport.
 - Japan paid for American companies to fly cargo.
 - Main problem was limited capacity of airfields in Saudi Arabia.
 - ⁵ 7th MEB- equipment of maritime prepositioning ships (MPS) not combat ready.
 - Dead batteries.
 - No oil
 - Weapons needed zeroing and the Saudis were reluctant to allow establishment of firing ranges.
 - o Ammunition-was not delivered.
 - Stepped up employment of troops at the expense of spare parts, munitions. and other logistics commodities.
 - A-10s incompatibility of refueling nozzles.

- F-15 tires did not arrive.
- F-117s carried 2 bombs (GBU 10), which were less accurate than those needed (GBU-27).
- o Only 3 Patriot missiles in August.
- CENTCOM depended heavily on civilian commercial satellite network (vulnerability).
- Saudis imposed constraints on pilot training so as not to alarm civilian population.

• Personnel problems.

- Powell wanted to limit troops to 150,000, Schwarzkopf wanted 216,000, deployed 265,000.
- Schwarzkopf's leadership style was a decentralized approach.
- Schwarzkopf had full confidence in his commanders and gave them all a piece of the action; freedom to fight as they saw fit (p.67).
- Army/Marines saw threat differently and differed in tactical approaches.
- Schwarzkopf's failure to harmonize Army/Marine plans left critical strategic and tactical issues unresolved (p.74).

• Coalition Members.

- Repeated threats from Iraqis to strike Israel if CENTCOM launched offensive.
 - U.S. urged Israeli restraint.
- Prince Khalid Bin Sultan al Saud who was to lead Arab forces appeared to have little appreciation for American doctrine.
- Americans and Saudis disagreed on how to repel attack and had profound strategic and operational differences.
 - U.S. felt Saudi oil fields were targets.
 - Saudis saw it differently.
 - Khalid's plan kept Arab forces clear of where fighting would take place.

LESSON 4: ORGANIZATION OF JOINT FORCES

Requirement 1

Objective 1. Understand the organizational framework within which Joint forces are employed at the operational level of war. [JPME Area 1(b)(e), 2(a)]

Exam Items 8 and 10 apply.

Objective 2. Examine the structure, organization, and command relationships within a Joint task force. [JPME Area 1(b)(c)(e), 2(a)]

Exam Items 8, 9, 10, and 11 apply.

Objective 3. Differentiate between a service component and a functional component. [JPME Area 1(b)(e), 2(a)(d)]

Exam Items 8 and 10 apply.

The following material pertains to Objectives 1, 2, and 3.


- Joint forces are established at three levels: unified commands, subordinate unified.
 - Basis for establishing joint forces.
 - Geographic area.
 - UCP delineates.
 - Required military functions.
 - A joint force commander (JFC) has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission.
 - All joint forces include Service components due to administrative and logistics requirements of the joint force.
 - Some joint forces may include functional components.
 - Some joint forces may include a combination of Service components and functional components.
 - Marine aviation assets are always an issue during joint operations. The quote below comes directly from the UNAAF.

The MAGTF commander will retain OPCON of organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF aviation combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground combat element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets normally will be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander


will make sorties available to the JFC, for tasking through the joint force air component commander (JFACC), for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the JFC for tasking through the JFACC for the support of other components of the joint force or the joint force as a whole. Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the geographic combatant or subordinate JFC in the exercise of OPCON to assign missions, redirect efforts (e.g., the reapportionment and/or reallocation of any MAGTF TACAIR sorties when it has been determined by the JFC that they are required for higher priority missions), and direct coordination among the subordinate commanders to ensure unity of effort in accomplishment of the overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force.

NOTE: Sorties provided for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance are not "excess" sorties and will be covered in the air tasking order. These sorties provide a distinct contribution to the overall joint force effort. The JFC must exercise integrated control of air defense, long-range reconnaissance, and interdiction aspects of the joint operation or theater campaign. Excess sorties are in addition to these sorties.

- A **unified command** is a command with broad continuing missions under a single commander, is composed of forces from two or more military departments, and is established by the President through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The following graphic shows the existing unified commands.




- Primary responsibilities of the commander of a unified command:
 - Planning and conducting military operations.
 - Maintaining the preparedness of the command.
 - Carrying out assigned missions, tasks, and responsibilities.
 - Assigning tasks to, and directing coordination among, the subordinate commands to ensure unity of effort.
 - Communicating directly with the Service chiefs, CJCS, and the Secretary of Defense.
 - Keeping the CJCS advised of significant events and incidents.
- A **specified command** is a command that has broad continuing missions and is established by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS.
 - Currently, there are no specified commands.
 - Normally is composed of forces from one military department.
 - Commander has the same responsibilities as a unified commander.
- A **subordinate unified command** (subunified command) may be established on a geographical area or functional basis to conduct operations on a continuing basis.
 - Established by unified command commander when authorized by the President and Secretary of Defense through the CJCS.
 - Commanders of subunified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those
 of the commanders of unified commands and exercise OPCON of assigned commands
 and forces.
- A **joint task force** (JTF) is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing JTF commander
 - JTFs can be organized on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics.
 - JTF commander exercises operational control (OPCON) over assigned (and normally attached) forces.
 - The following graphic shows the JTF organizational options.



- Service component commands at the combatant command-level consist of the Service component commander and all the Service forces (individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations, including the support forces) that have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subunified command or JTF.
- Responsibilities of the Service component commander.
 - Make recommendations to the joint force commander (JFC) on the proper employment of the forces of the Service component.
 - Accomplish such operational missions as may be assigned.
 - Select and nominate specific units of the parent Service component for assignment to other subordinate forces.
 - Conduct joint training.
 - Inform their JFC of planning for changes in logistic support that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability.
 - Develop program and budget requests that comply with combatant commander guidance on warfighting requirements.
 - Inform the combatant commander of program and budget decisions that may affect joint operational planning.
 - Provide, as requested, supporting joint operation and exercise plans with necessary force data.
 - Internal administration and discipline.
 - Training in own Service doctrine.
 - Logistics functions normal to the command.
 - Service intelligence matters.

- Functional component commands may be established by combatant commanders, commanders of subunified commands and JTFs to integrate planning, reduce span of control, and/or significantly improve combat efficiency during operational missions that may be of short or extended duration.
 - Responsibilities and authority of a functional component commander must be assigned by the establishing JFC.
 - Functional component commander normally a Service component commander, as well.
 - Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked will be designated as the functional component commander.
 - Functional components are not considered a "joint force" with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force as described in the UNAAF (p. V-19).
- For specific responsibilities for functional component commanders, see JP 5-00.2 pages III-6 to III-13.
 - The various functional components commands are:
 - Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC).
 - Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC).
 - o Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC).
 - o Joint Force Special Operations Component Command (JFSOCC).
 - o Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF).
 - Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF).
- The following chart graphically depicts the kinds of components that can exist within a joint force.



Objective 4. Understand the command relationships of Combatant Command (command authority) (COCOM), Operational Control (OPCON), Tactical Control (TACON), and Support. Assess these relationships with regard to responsibility vs. authority. [JPME Area 1(b)(d), 2(a)]

Exam Item 9 and 11 apply.


Objective 5. Understand the basic elements, differences, and interrelationships of COCOM, OPCON, TACON, and Support. [JPME Area 1(b)(d), 2(a), 3(e)]

Exam Item 9 and 11 apply.


The following material pertains to both Objectives 4 and 5.

- Levels of authority exist because the authority vested in a commander must be commensurate with the responsibility assigned. The four levels of command authority are:
 - Combatant command (command authority) (COCOM).
 - Unique to the combatant commander.
 - Cannot be delegated.
 - Authority exists only over assigned forces.
 - Authority listed in following chart (Exhaustive list found in UNAAF, pages III-4 to III-7).
 - Operational control (OPCON).
 - May be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command.
 - Commander of subordinate commands, including JTFs, normally will be given OPCON of assigned and attached forces.
 - Authority listed in following chart (Exhaustive list found in UNAAF, pages III-7 to III-8.
 - Tactical control (TACON).
 - Exercised over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.
 - TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command.
 - Authority listed in following chart (Exhaustive list found in UNAAF, page III-8.
 - Support.
 - May be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command.
 - Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force.
 - Supported commander should ensure that the supporting commander understands the assistance required.
 - An establishing directive normally is issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken.

• Authority listed in following chart (Exhaustive list found in UNAAF, pages III-9 to III-10.



- Several categories of support have been defined for use within a combatant command to better characterize the support that should be given. The following chart shows those categories of support.



- There are other authorities outside the command relationships.
 - Administrative control (ADCON).
 - Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support.
 - ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in title 10, USC.
 - May be delegated to and exercised by commanders of Service forces assigned to a combatant commander at any echelon at or below the level of Service component command.
 - Coordinating authority.
 - May be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command.
 - The authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more military departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service (e.g., joint rear area coordinator exercises coordinating authority for rear area operations among the component commanders).
 - Is a consultation relationship between commander, not an authority by which command may be exercised.
 - More applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations.
 - Direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH).
 - Authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command.
 - More applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting DIRLAUTH informed.
 - A coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

LESSON 5: CAMPAIGNING AND THE OPERATIONAL ART

Requirement 1

Objective 1. Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning from the design phase to operations. [JPME Area 2(a), 4(a)(b)(e)]

Exam Items 12 and 14 apply.


Objective 2. Understand the differences between a campaign's conceptual, functional, and detailed designs. [JPME Area 4(a)(e)]

Exam Item 18 applies.

The following material pertains to both Objectives 1 and 2.

- Campaigning (campaign design and campaign planning) is a difficult concept to grasp. Joint and USMC doctrine are very general in their discussion of what campaigning is and how to conduct it.
- The following chart is offered for your use in trying to help our students understand a process that requires significant experience on joint force or component staffs. This chart also shows how operational art ties into campaigning. This chart is derived from the discussions in doctrine but is not included in any doctrinal publications. It is our interpretation of joint and U.S. doctrine and attempts to put campaigning and all its associated terms and notions in to some sort of organized perspective.

Campaigning and Operational Art



- We recommend you keep this chart constantly available for discussion. In fact, use this chart toward the end of this lesson as a tool to tie in several of the discussions from each of the requirements.

- A campaign is defined as a series of related military operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 1-02 and 3-0).
 - Campaigns are joint in nature and serve as the focus for conduct of war and MOOTW.
 - Campaigns are the synchronization and integration of necessary air, land, sea, space, and special operations—as well as interagency and multinational operations—in harmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to attain national and multinational objectives.
- Campaign design begins with the military strategic aim.
 - According to USMC doctrine (MCDP 1-2) there are only two ways to use military force to impose our political will on an enemy.
 - Strategy of annihilation.
 - We seek an unlimited political objective.
 - Focus on eliminating the enemy's capacity to resist.
 - Possess conceptual simplicity.
 - Victory is easily assessed: enemy's fighting forces are not longer able to present organized resistance.
 - Strategy of Erosion.
 - We seek a limited political goal and do not require the destruction of the enemy leadership, government, or state.
 - Have a much wider choice in our operational main efforts and the relation between military force and our other instruments of national power.
 - Definition is much more flexible.
 - May choose a non-military solution.
 - The theory of center of gravity (key source of strength, power, and resistance, something the enemy needs to survive) comes in the form of strategic, operational, and tactical centers of gravity.
 - Strategic: Objective whose seizure, destruction, or neutralization will have a profound impact on the enemy's will or ability to continue the struggle.
 - Operational: Normally an element of the enemy's armed forces.
 - Both may be the same or completely different.
 - Critical vulnerabilities are critical requirements of a center of gravity that allow us to indirectly attack a center of gravity, especially since centers of gravity are hard to attack directly.
- USMC doctrine describes the process of design.
 - Conceptual planning: Creating a broad scheme for accomplishing our goals.

- Functional planning: Designing the functional components necessary to support the concept. Working through the feasibility of the campaign concept with respect to every functional area (C2, maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and force protection).
- Detailed planning: Encompasses the specific planning activities necessary to ensure that the plan is coordinated: specific command relationships, movements, landing tables, deployment or resupply schedules, communications plans, reconnaissance plans, control measures, etc.

Objective 3. Comprehend how national security strategy, policy, and national level assets affect a combatant commander's theater strategy and related campaign planning. [JPME Area 4(a)(b)]

Exam Items 18 and 19 apply.

Objective 4. Understand how theater combatant commanders translate national strategic direction into theater strategies and guidance in the development of the campaign plan through the strategic estimate process. [JPME Area 4(a)(e)]

Exam Item 17 applies.

Objective 5. Understand the key fundamentals of campaign plans. [JPME Area 4(e)]

Exam Items 17, 18, and 19 apply.

Objective 6. Understand the characteristics of a military campaign and the theater commander's theater strategy. [JPME Area 3(c), 4(a)(e)]

Exam Items 17 and 18 apply.

Objective 7. Comprehend how to use doctrinal information on the relationship between campaign planning and Joint operations; be able to summarize the considerations for employing Joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war. [JPME Area 2(a), 3(a)(c), 4(e)]

Exam Items 17 and 18 apply.

The following material pertains to Objectives 3 through 7.


- In peacetime, national policy, national security strategy, defense policy, and the national military strategy (NMS) are sources of guidance for combatant commanders.
- U.S. and alliance and/or coalition strategic objectives are the basis for combatant command strategies.
- Strategic end state is something the President and Secretary of Defense should establish.

- Once clearly defined, the combatant commander establishes a set of military conditions that achieve the strategic objectives.
 - Often end state is vague or just not defined at all.
 - Commanders at all levels should have a common understanding of the conditions that define, success.
- The strategic estimate is a tool available to combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs as they develop campaign plans and subordinate campaign and operation plans.
 - Commanders focus on the threat and consider other circumstances affecting the military situation as they develop and analyze COA.
 - Continuous process.
 - Process based on direction from national and multinational leaders.
 - Commanders develop strategic estimate after reviewing strategic environment, potential threats, the nature of anticipated operations, and national strategic direction.
 - Aids in clarifying strategic end state and supporting military conditions.
 - The following graphic shows the strategic estimate.

Strategic Estimate

- · Assigned objectives from national authorities
- Translation of national objectives to objectives applicable to the combatant command or theater
- Visualization of the strategic environment and how it relates to the accomplishment of assigned objectives
- Assessment of the threats to accomplishment of assigned objectives
- Assessment of strategic alternatives available, with accompanying analysis, risks, and the requirements for plans
- Considerations of available resources, linked to accomplishment of assigned objectives
- Campaign plans:
 - Define objectives.
 - Establish command relationships.
 - Describe concepts of operations and sustainment.
 - Arrange operations in time, space, and purpose.
 - Assign tasks.

- Organize forces.
- Synchronize and integrate air, land, sea, space, information, and special operations.
- Relationship of campaign planning to joint operational planning.
 - Campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. See the following graphic.
 - Campaign plans guide the development of supporting OPLANs.
 - Based on the campaign plan, appropriate elements are translated into the operation order format of JOPES for execution.



*Based on theater-unique conditions, campaign planning principles will be used to develop plans and orders.

- Campaign plans form the basis for developing subordinate campaign plans and supporting plans.
- Campaign plans are used by national authorities as well as by subordinates.
- Two types of campaign plans.
 - Theater campaigns synthesize deployment, employment, sustainment, and subordinate operations into a coherent whole.
 - Subordinate campaigns are developed by subordinate JFCs that accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) theater strategic objectives.
- Theater campaign plans are time sensitive, iterative, and adaptive, depending upon the mission and forces available.
 - Fundamentals of campaign planning are shown below.

FUNDAMENTALS OF CAMPAIGN PLANS

- Provide broad strategic concepts of operations and sustainment for achieving multinational, national and theater strategic objectives.
- Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.
- Achieve unity of effort with air, land, sea, space and special operations forces, in conjunction with interagency, multinational, nongovernmental, private voluntary, or United Nations forces, as required.
- Incorporate the combatant commander's strategic intent and operational focus.
- Identify any special forces or capabilities the enemy has in the area.
- Identify the enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance to subordinates for defeating them.
- Identify the friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance to subordinates for protecting them.
- Sequence a series of related major joint operations conducted simultaneously in depth.
- Establish the organization of subordinate forces and designate command relationships.
- Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict termination objectives and potential post-hostilities activities.
- Provide strategic direction; operational focus; and major tasks, objectives, and concepts to subordinates.
- Provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons as required and authorized by the national Command Authorities.

Requirement 3

Objective 8. Understand how to apply Joint doctrine to the campaign design and planning process—to provide strategic direction and operational focus through the application of the fundamentals of theater strategic and operational design. [JPME Area 2(a), 3(e), 4(a)(b)(e)]

Exam Items 12, 13, 14, and 16 apply.

Objective 9. Comprehend the actions that are inherent in designing a succinct plan or campaign that translates the theater commander's strategic vision into a concept of operation and assigns tasks necessary for subordinate forces to carry out. [JPME Area 1(b)(e), 2(a), 3(c), 4(a)(e)]

Exam Item 13 applies.

The following material pertains to both Objectives 8 and 9.

- Joint doctrine describes the characteristics of campaign planning as:
 - The way that the JFC coordinates, employs, and sustains over time the available resources.
 - A phased series of major operations.
 - Focused on the adversary's centers of gravity (COGs).
 - An authoritative synchronization and integration of air, land, sea, space, and special operations efforts along with deployment and sustainment to attain the strategic or operational objectives.
 - It integrates information operations.
 - It translates strategic guidance into operational direction for subordinates.
 - Logistics sets the campaign's operational limits.
- Joint doctrine defines considerations for developing a campaign plan. They are:
 - What military or related political and social conditions (objectives) must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends.)
 - What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways.)
 - How should resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means.)
 - What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing a particular sequence of actions? (COA Analysis.)
- Campaign planning has its greatest application in war but can be an effective methodology for situations other than war (MOOTW).
 - The following are some campaign planning considerations for MOOTW and promote unity of effort:
 - Statement of the national problem.
 - Relevant national interests.
 - Stated or perceived military mission.
 - Nature of physical environment.
 - Nature of the local society.
 - Nature of external forces.
 - Nature of the crisis.
 - Impact of time as it affects the environment and key players.
 - Host-nation support agreements.
 - Significant logistic support concerns.
 - Legal status of U.S. personnel in the operational area.
- Campaign design process is primarily an intellectual exercise based on experience and judgment. The result of this process should provide the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means for the campaign.
- Key elements of operational design are:

- Understanding the strategic guidance (determining the desired end state and military objective(s)).
 - Conflict and/or war termination must be considered.
- Identifying the critical factors (principle adversary strengths, including the strategic COGs and weaknesses).
 - Adversary critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities must be identified in conjunction with each COG.
- Developing an operational concept or scheme that will achieve the strategic objective(s).
 - o Focus on objectives and results of COG analysis.
 - Decisive points (are not COGs; they are the keys to attacking or protecting them) identified.
 - Apply forces and capabilities.
 - Sequence operations using phasing.
 - Synchronize operations: Time, space, and purpose for maximum effect.

Objective 10. Understand the facets of operational art. [JPME Area 3(a)(b)]

Exam Items 2, 13, and 18 apply.


Objective 11. Understand the relationship between campaign planning and operational art. [JPME Area 3(a)(b)(e)]

Exam Items 13 and 18 apply.

The following material pertains to both Objectives 10 and 11.

- Operational art is defined by JP 1-02 and 3-0 as: The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war.
- JFCs employ operational art, in concert with strategic guidance and direction received from superior leaders, in developing campaigns and operations. The fundamental elements or facets of operational art are shown in the following chart.


Facets of Operational Art



- For a more detailed description of these facets of operational art, see JP3-0 pages III-9 to III-25
- General Saint in his article "A CINC's View of Operational Art," points out several interesting observations of applying operational art while being an army group commander at the operational level of war. These observations are:
- (General Saint talks about corps and army group commanders; we'll refer to them as commanders or commanders at the operational level of war, both meaning the same).
 - Commanders at the operational level of war are half "shaper" and half "integrator".
 - Shapers.
 - They bring the normally disparate combat elements together in sequence, over time
 - The shaper's product is the essence of operational art.
 - o Integrators.
 - Normally found at brigade and division command levels, focus all available combat power at the right place and time—where the fighters are.
 - Must decide when to fight, when not to fight, and whom to fight.
 - Once the end state and resource allocation phases of initial campaign planning are well
 under way, the commander at the operational level further shapes the operation in his
 mind through the staff planning process.
 - He links movements and battles.
 - Establishes control measures and contingency plans.
 - Operational level commanders must avoid doing everyone else's job after they have laid the groundwork for the campaign.

- A key element of shaping and integrating is the employment of reserves.
 - For shapers, reserves are the instruments of integration; that is, they are the tools for commanders to win campaigns.
- Maneuver (gaining and maintaining positional advantage) at the operational level includes positioning sustainment and command and control assets.
- There are six other elements critical to the operational level commander as the shaper and integrator in campaign planning and execution.
 - o Intelligence.
 - o Initiative.
 - o Sustainment.
 - o Communications.
 - Operational fires.
 - o Command and control.
- As a reminder on operational art's function within the process of campaigning, the first chart in this lesson is again provided.

Campaigning and Operational Art



Requirement 5

Objective 12. Examine the commander's intent during the Desert Storm Campaign and understand how it contributed to the campaign planning process. [JPME Area 3(c), 4(e)]

Exam Item 19 applies.

- The only reading for this requirement is General Schwarzkopf's commander's intent and strategic vision.

- Information in his intent, which was given on 25 August 1990, that contributed to the campaign process are:
 - Execute deception operations.
 - Attack into the Iraqi homeland.
 - Decapitate his leadership, command and control.
 - Eliminate his ability to reinforce into Kuwait.
 - Gain undisputed air superiority.
 - Seize key lines of communication.
 - Interdict supply lines.
 - Eliminate forces in Kuwait.
- Information in his strategic vision given well after his intent, that contributed to the campaign planning process are (note: some of these are duplicate from his intent):
 - Deter Iraq from attacking Saudi Arabia.
 - Iraq strengths being mass and chemical capability.
 - Attack leadership and command and control.
 - Gain and maintain air superiority.
 - Totally cut enemy supply lines.
 - Destroy chemical, biological, and nuclear capability.
 - Destroy the Republican Guard.
 - The balance of his strategic vision contained how he envisioned doing all of this.

Objective 13. Compare and contrast the methods and results of the campaign design of CENTCOM's Operation Desert Storm. [JPME Area 2(c), 3(c), 4(e)]

Exam Item 15 applies.

Objective 14. Compare and contrast the methods and results of campaign planning for CENTCOM's Operation Desert Storm. [JPME Area 2(c), 3(a)(c), 4(e)]

No exam question.

The following material pertains to both Objectives 13 and 14.

The Generals' War: Chapter 4, Instant Thunder

- Instant Thunder was a focused, intense, air campaign designed to incapacitate Iraqi leadership and destroy key military capability in a short period of time.
 - Designed to keep basic Iraqi infrastructure intact.
- If Americans were harmed CENTCOM wanted retaliatory options.

- o Schwarzkopf called General J. M. Loh (Air Force Vice COS) on 8 Aug for help.
- o Loh passed the request to Col Warden who ran the Checkmate war-gaming office.
 - Checkmate drew on intelligence, target, and weapon specialists throughout government to analyze and simulate realistic air campaigns.
 - Warden developed the initial *Instant Thunder* plan, and although General Horner (JFACC) initially hated what he considered "Washington's" plan, it represented a revolution in warfare.
 - Warden developed the "Five Rings" approach:
 - o Center ring: C3/Decision-Making
 - o Ring 2: Military/Economic Production/Power.
 - o Ring 3: Transportation/Movement/Distribution.
 - o Ring 4: Population/Food.
 - o Ring 5: Enemy Forces.
- Aim of *Instant Thunder* was to persuade Saddam Hussein to pull out of Kuwait and sue for peace, or to create conditions for his overthrow.
 - Instant Thunder was a concentrated 6-day aerial coup de main that included 700 attacks per day.
- Clausewitz argued war went from outside in, *Instant Thunder* would wage ware from inside out—the first truly strategic air war.
 - Warden said *Instant Thunder* was the aerial equivalent of WWI Schlieffen plan where the left wing would blunt the offensive while right wing would outflank the main force and attack the center of gravity at the rear.
 - Air attacks on Baghdad were the vertical equivalent of right wing assault, and close air interdiction of Iraqi armies were the equivalent of Schlieffen's left wing holding force.
- Schwarzkopf thought the UN would call for a cease-fire in 3-4 days.
- Powell, skeptical of airpower claims, set in motion a huge deployment of ground troops.
 - He was also concerned with *Instant Thunder*'s lack of strikes on ground troops.
 - Felt the one million man, 5000 tank, Iraqi force should be reduced to 100K men and 1000 tanks—only sufficient for defense
 - Expanded planning to an all Service-planning group under MajGen J. W. Meier (JCS deputy ops officer)
- Planners from the Tactical Air Command (TAC) at Langley AFB, Virginia, felt the Pentagon should not be doing CENTCOM's campaign planning, that this violated the cardinal lesson of Vietnam, and that the Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened combatant commander authority to preclude this kind of thing.
 - TAC felt the focus should be on troop support, and that there should be bombing pauses to give Saddam Hussein a chance to seek diplomatic solutions (reminiscent of graduated escalation in Vietnam).

- In the beginning *Instant Thunder* included 84 targets accompanied by PSYOP to deny Saddam Hussein support and encourage his overthrow.
 - On the first two days strategic targets would be attacked simultaneously.
 - On days 3-4 re-attacks would be accomplished based on battle damage assessment (BDA).
 - On days 5-6 attacks would focus on chemical warfare (CW) production and other military-industrial targets.
- Warden later drafted a plan for a several-phased attack:
 - Phase one would be *Instant Thunder*.
 - Phase two would be a 1-day effort to achieve air superiority over Kuwait.
 - Phase three would attack ground forces.
- Warden estimated a max of 40 U.S. aircraft losses over 6 days based on our use of mass, shock, and destruction of C3.
 - Schwarzkopf admitted after the war that he felt the plan fulfilled two functions:
 - It served as a list of target category options useful as retaliatory strikes.
 - He saw it as a precursor to a ground war offensive plan.
 - Both of these views ran contrary to Warden's idea that *Instant Thunder* was a recipe for victory.
- Horner felt Warden's C2 analysis needed work.
 - He felt that the reliance on smart weapons should be replaced by an emphasis on precision delivery platforms (F-16s), and did not trust F-117 weapon delivery or radar-evasion.
 - He also felt Washington was minimizing the defensive problem, and that the plan didn't show how it would work with a land offensive or how CENCOM would respond if the air campaign triggered an Iraqi ground assault.
- Horner sent Warden back to Washington after his briefing on the plan but kept his Lt Cols in Riyadh to help Lt Gen Buster Glosson develop the air campaign plan.
 - Glosson's planning was done by a compartmentalized planning group known as the Black Hole.
 - He felt the initial plan did not explain how air power should be used if the 6-day war did not produce victory, and that it lacked provisions for attacks against the Republican Guard.
 - Glosson and Lt Col Deptula presented the reworked plan to Horner on 26 Aug and were asked for a 24 hour air tasking order (ATO) that could be executed quickly.
 - Navy counterparts disagreed on the plan from the start.
 - Felt simultaneous target attack would result in high loses.
 - Thought U.S. planners did not understand Iraqi air defenses.
 - Felt BDA would not be timely enough to allow for day 3-4 retargeting.
 - Vice Admiral H. H. Mauz, Commander of Navy forces, argued for a traditional roll-back campaign which would optimize the Navy's role.
 - Schwarzkopf approved the plan 3 Sep, and Powell was briefed 12 Sep.

- The "stand-alone" airpower option stayed under wraps until Air Force COS Gen Dugan told reporters "the cutting edge would be downtown Baghdad...we are looking for centers of gravity...and Hussein ought to be at the focus of our efforts."
- Powell was outraged at the suggestion the Air Force could single-handedly win the war and felt secrets had been divulged.
- Cheney felt Dugan said the plan had been decided on by JCS, forecast massive Baghdad bombing, and that he had given out secret details—Cheney requested Dugan's resignation.

The Generals' War: Chapter 6, "High Diddle Diddle"

- "I can't let Norm do this high diddle diddle up-the-middle plan."—Dick Cheney
- Lt Col Joseph Purvis was chosen to head up a special team that would plan the ground offensive to evict the Iraqis from Kuwait.
 - It was a self-contained group, without Marine involvement and no direct contact with Colin Powell's staff in Washington.
 - The only direction Schwarzkopf gave was that American forces were NOT to go into Kuwait City.
 - Codename for the land offensive was Eager Anvil.
- In September, Purvis set up shop. The cover story was that they were studying desert warfare. But as rumors spread as to what they were really doing, Army officers dubbed them the Jedi Knights, a term of respect laced with a touch of sarcasm. The Jedi's central presupposition was that military power was to be conserved for a possible fight with the Republican Guard.
- Three possible courses of action developed by Jedis: up the middle attack, and two variations of a left hook.
 - The two left hooks involved attacks west of Wadi al-Batin, but were ruled out because they were seen as too demanding logistically, and the Army's supply lines would be vulnerable to an Iraqi counterattack.
 - The up-the-middle attack was planned for just east of Wadi al-Batin, using the 1st Cavalry Division, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment.
 - The Marines would break through Iraqi forward defenses, then protect the armored advance's right flank.
 - If needed, the 101st Airborne would mount an assault to control the escarpment west of Kuwait City.
 - Bypassing the Iraqi army units in Kuwait, the American Army would go to the Iraq-Kuwait border and invite the Iraqis to attack them. If the Republican Guard tried to flee, CENTCOM would go after them with airpower.
- Purvis briefed Schwarzkopf on the "up the middle" plan on 5 October.

- Purvis was uncomfortable with his plan; the coalition was outnumbered, and Purvis felt another Army corps was needed.
- Soon after the briefing, Powell called Schwarzkopf and asked for a briefing on CENTCOM's air and ground plans. White House hawks were pressing Powell.
 Schwarzkopf had been caught short. The air plan was in good shape, but the ground plan had gotten off to a late start, and he didn't have much to show for the effort.
- The 10 Oct briefing of Cheney, Powell, and the Service chiefs of staff did not go well, at least for the ground plan.
 - Marine Corps Commandant Al Gray objected vehemently to the plan, which had been prepared without consulting the Marines. The ground plan lacked the forces needed to guarantee success, and relied very heavily on airpower and the collapse of the Iraqi forces; it would take another corps to ensure that the U.S. could attack the Iraqis on the ground and defeat them.
- The 11 Oct White House meeting was a defining moment in the evolution of the groundand air-war plans.
 - Glosson ran through the air war target list, which included attacks on Saddam's residences and Iraq's political institutions.
 - Bush liked the air war plan, and only requested that Powell make doubly sure that no targets of religious or historic significance were on the target list.
 - The discussion shifted to the ground offensive.
 - Purvis talked through the plan to attack through the Iraqi defenses.
 - Brent Scowcroft questioned why the Army was attacking into the strength of the Iraq defense.
 - Powell took over for Purvis, and told Scowcroft that the Army could not logistically sustain an attack from the west and did not have an adequately sized force.
 - Bush asked how much was needed; Powell said one more corps, and it could be in place by January 1. The meeting ended.
- The White House meeting was a turning point that foreshadowed all the key decisions in planning the war.
 - Bush concluded that military action was necessary to evict Iraq.
 - He accepted Powell's argument that airpower was insufficient to do the job.
 - The Jedi's one corps plan was unacceptable, and Bush had pointed the way to a two-corps plan, attacking in the west.
 - Schwarzkopf had indicated that another corps was needed, but had failed to explain in his briefing how it would be used.
 - o Powell was against forcing a confrontation with Iraq.
 - Cheney always wanted to do it now—he was already beginning to formulate his own plan—the Western Excursion.

The Generals' War: Chapter 7, "The Western Excursion"

• Schwarzkopf's one Corps plan for Kuwait (high diddle diddle...) is rejected.

- An "Inchon-type" landing possibility did not exist for Kuwait.
- Schwarzkopf no longer had a monopoly on land war planning, with Gen. Powell, and SECDEF Cheney also involved. Cheney's idea, from Henry Rowen, Assistant Defense Secretary for International Security Affairs, was drawn from Sir John Bagot Glubb's book, *History of the Arab Peoples*.
 - Olubb reported that Arab and British forces put down a pro-Nazi Iraqi rebellion, in 1941, with a two-pronged attack from Transjordan (Jordan) and Basra. If they could maneuver in Iraq's western desert, so could the Americans.
 - o Logistics would be demanding, but it was an American strength.
 - The Americans could not use Jordan, but they could use the Tapline Rd. to Hafar al-Batin.
- Cheney's planning group, led by LTG Vessey, developed the "Western Excursion Plan."
 - Its advantages:
 - Shock.
 - Threat to Baghdad, Iraqi regime collapse.
 - Occupy western Iraqi desert for negotiations.
 - Easy air assault against Iraqi counterattack.
 - Cut-off Jordan logistics support.
 - Attack scuds to keep Israel out of war.
- General Powell's own plan, headed by LtGen Brandtner, USMC and LTG Kelly, USA, was a large flanking move to the west, using overwhelming power, with "no possibility of failure."
 - This "no name plan," incorporated logistics planners—a cross section of military expertise.
 - The Marines had no role, except draw Iraqi attention east.
 - o The move west would "buy off" Cheney's Western Excursion Plan.
 - These flanking movements circumvented Iraqi defenses, and the Tapline Rd. provided supplies.
- Schwarzkopf's plan had to pass Powell's muster. Powell had embraced the USAF's Air War Plan in Sep 90, and it had been smooth sailing since then.
 - Headed by BG Arnold, USA, Schwarzkopf's "Jedis," guided by Schwarzkopf's volcanic temper, developed a two corps, plus British forces, main attack up the 70 mile stretch of flat desert, the "bowling alley," west of Wadi al-Batin, rushing to the Euphrates and attacking, and destroying the Republican Guard—not merely forcing them out.
 - The Jedi Plan was a left hook, but not the roundhouse left punch Powell's team had secretly prepared and far from Cheney's Western Excursion.
- Both Powell and Schwarzkopf were willing to let sanctions go one year. Schwarzkopf's "Jedis" briefed Powell on the one and two corps plans. Powell questioned LTC Purvis closely on the one corps plan, before requesting the forces for the two corps plan.

- While Powell was overseas, Cheney had Powell's planning cell "gussy-up" the Western Excursion Plan, and he and Admiral Jeremiah, Vice Chairman JCS, briefed President Bush on it.
- Powell and Schwarzkopf then joined forces in ground war planning with Powell asking Schwarzkopf for a CENTCOM evaluation of Cheney's Western Excursion plan.
 - BG Arnold dutifully assailed the plan. Schwarzkopf did not want "bargaining chips," in western Iraq, did not think the Scud much of a threat, and wanted the destruction of the Republican Guard.
 - The Jedi's left hook was pushed further west, to placate the SECDEF, but Schwarzkopf was now asking how far west the corps could be supported logistically. No more one corps plans would come from the military.
 - Rowen's Western excursion had served its purpose, according to Cheney.
- President Bush was the most hawkish of the White House hawks.
 - The Coalition could not be held together 12-18 months for sanctions to work, and Muslim holidays, and broiling summer sun, all argued for a winter war.
 - Powell asked to double the force (more than Schwarzkopf had requested), to ensure decisive victory, or scare Saddam (and maybe President Bush too), with shear numbers and equipment: VII Corps, 6 carrier groups, and more reserves.
 - President Bush was determined to give the military everything it needed.
- The administration needed to get the UN Security Council's endorsement, then the US Congress's.
- November 1990, while the U.S. chaired the Council, began the trips to Moscow, London, and Paris.
 - In Germany, VII Corps was told to begin planning, and then it was told to stop—until after the NOV elections.
 - Secretary Baker warned Arab capitals, the air war would be lengthy, and that Israel would not strike first, and hopefully, not in retaliation.
 - President Mubarak told Baker, Egypt would remain with the Coalition, even if Israel, rightfully, acted in self-defense.
 - Domestically, the decision to defend Saudi Arabia had met widespread support, but the decision to send reinforcements and consider the offensive option had split the Congress.
 - Admiral Crowe testified sanctions should have one year to work.
 - The next day, with Secretary Baker chairing the Security Council, Resolution 678 was passed, authorizing military action against Iraq, on 15 Jan 91.
 - Saddam Hussein released hostages that were to be used as human shields at key targets. This did not slow the progress toward war, only simplifying military matters.
- Schwarzkopf met with Corps and Division Commanders in Dhahran, saying the three centers of gravity were: the Republican Guard, nuclear and chemical weapons, and Saddam Hussein himself

- Strategic air war would last 6 days, with 12 more days of air attacks on Iraqi ground forces.
- Saddam had to go or be discredited.
- XVIII Airborne Corps, led by the 10lst Airborne Div., would attack in the west, going to the Euphrates, to block reinforcements, or the Republican Guard's escape.
- The 82nd Airborne Div., first the reserve, would now be the left flank guard.
- The VII Corps would be the main effort, against the Republican Guard.
- The 1st Cav. Div. would be the reserve, assistance for the Arab members in the Coalition.
- The Marines and the British would attack in the east.
- The Western Excursion Plan (Cheney/Rowen) was dead, but it had challenged the military to accept the plan, or develop a more imaginative one.

NOTE: When the ground war started, the left hook was so far left that the French and 82nd Airborne were out of the action, while the VII Corps encountered only marginal Iraqi units, yet not far enough west to interfere with the Scud launches against Israel, or threaten Baghdad, both elements of Secretary Cheney's original plan. CENTCOM, belatedly, sent Special Operations Forces into the western desert to deal with the Scuds, acknowledging that plan's correctness.

Requirement 7

Objective 15. Comprehend the campaign plan key points and understand the major objectives for the conduct of offensive operations against Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO). [JPME Area 3(a)(c)]

Exam Item 19 applies.

The Generals' War: Chapter 8, Tell it to the Marines

- While the Army's flanking attack was falling into place, the Marine mission was up for grabs. The Marines had been the first ground forces to get any substantial combat power on the ground. They had, in effect, covered for the Army.
- Now that CENTCOM was looking to go north, the Jedis had concluded that the most important contribution the Marines could make was to support the Army's left hook. There was one complication. The Jedis had never consulted the Marine high command about this. The Jedis were treating the Marines as an adjunct of the Army.
- While the Jedis were plotting the attack, the Marines had been struggling to come up with their own offensive plan. LtGen Walter Boomer (MARCENT/I MEF Commander) was furious that Schwarzkopf's planning cell had been preparing a land offensive for two months without the Marine's knowledge, let alone participation.
- Boomer had more problems than just the Jedis.

- General Alfred Gray, the Marine Corps commandant, did not consider Boomer to be the man for the job in the Gulf. Boomer was not one of the trusted executors of the newer Marine doctrine of maneuver warfare. When the appropriate time came, Boomer expressed his disagreement with the Army plan.
- Schwarzkopf agreed with him.
 - The Marines would have a real mission.
 - They were free to come up with their own plan.
 - He trusted the Marine commander to develop an effective plan that would avoid excessive American casualties.
 - As Schwarzkopf would learn later, he had more confidence in Boomer than the Marine commandant did.
- Iraq's military strategy was the embodiment of the old military axiom that when the generals don't know what to do, they do what they know. Iraq had little experience with air warfare and none fighting an enemy proficient in mobile armored tactics.
- Boomer knew that with enough firepower and troops he could bull his way through the enemy, but the cost would be high and it was not how he was taught to fight
- Boomer got conflicting intelligence reports on the Iraqis. Some reported that Americans were outnumbered by three to one in men and by more than five to one in tanks, even with the British brigade. One of Boomer's trusted intelligence officers argued that the Iraqi military was overrated.
- The inclusion of the British 1st Armored Division in what the Jedis persisted in seeing as essentially a diversionary Marine attack seemed like a waste.
- Everybody was getting a piece of the action instead of subordinating the forces to one goal, the destruction of the Republican Guard.
 - The British wanted to participate in the main flanking attack, not a secondary attack, particularly one they feared would be a bloody charge into Iraqi fortifications.
 - The Army and British commanders drew on their NATO relationships and forced a decision to switch the British forces from the Marines to the Army.
 - Schwarzkopf's duties were political as well as military. The request to shift the
 troops was a high priority for London and reflected a concern over the welfare of its
 troops. He felt he had little choice but to accept it. The alliance between the Jedi and
 British planners had proven to be more powerful than the CENTCOM commander
 himself.
 - Not willing to give in, Boomer requested an American armored Army unit and additional artillery as compensation.
 - Schwarzkopf ordered the Army to provide "like forces." But the Army did not intend to be generous. Unless they gave the Marines less than they were taking away, there was little sense in shifting the British forces over in the first place.
 - The Marines were given a brigade out of the Army units held in reserve to back up the coming offensive. The Army commanders were nervous about the shotgun marriage between the Tiger Brigade and the Marine forces. It had been a long

- time since a Marine general had command over an Army unit, and not all the precedents were good ones.
- The Marines were given "operational control" over the Army unit, which meant that Boomer had the same authority over the Tiger Brigade in battle as he would over a Marine unit. Despite the anxiety that surrounded the Tiger Brigade's subordination to Marine control, it formed a surprisingly successful and fruitful alliance with the Marines.
- Another of Boomer's problems was the Arab forces. His opinion was almost as low as his view of the Iraqis. He did not invest much time in solidifying ties with the Saudis, nor did the Saudis fully trust the Marines. The strain complicated relations between the Marines and the Saudis throughout the war and hampered Marine planning when it came time to pick a point of attack.
 - If Boomer wanted to attack up the coast, the Saudis would have to agree to move out of their positions and follow the Marines in trace. But the trick was persuading the Saudis, particularly Prince Khalid.
 - Schwarzkopf presented the plan, and Khalid rejected it out of hand. The reason: PRIDE! Boomer was actually relieved because he had not been persuaded that the plan was such a good idea in the first place. There was little maneuver room due to oil installations and civilian communities.
- At the Marine Corps Headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, all of Boomer's options looked equally bad to General Gray. With Congress's efforts to strengthen the role of the theater commander, it was generally agreed that the Service chiefs were not to get heavily involved in the planning process.
 - Gray suggested a "second front" alternative that was dead on arrival because it required bringing Jordan into the war. American diplomacy was aimed at keeping Jordan out of the war.
 - The idea didn't fly, but it amounted to a vote of no confidence by the Marine commandant in the top Marine commander in the field. He assembled a study team to come up with another way of avoiding the Iraqi defenses in southern Kuwait, a major amphibious operation.
 - o There were some serious logistical obstacles as well as political problems implicit in a military operation that would take place close to the border with Iran.
 - o The ambitious plan would require a wholesale restructuring of the Marine forces in the Gulf.
 - In the meantime, Gray made a visit to the Gulf and was briefed on the Marine plan.
 - To Gray, the plan looked like a recipe for disaster. The Marines had never attempted a passage of lines on that scale before, and the plan called for two of them.
 - But the Marine command did not have much choice. Iraq had purchased thousands of mines, and for all the billions spent during the Reagan administration, relatively little had been spent for mine-clearing equipment.
 - o The case for shaking up the Marine command seemed to the Commandant to be clearer than ever.

- Meeting privately with Schwarzkopf, Gray told him that he had lost confidence in Boomer and had an idea for restructuring the Marine hierarchy in the Gulf.
 - He wanted to leave Boomer as the field commander and put a three-star general senior to Boomer in Riyadh.
 - Schwarzkopf was taken aback by the eleventh-hour proposal. He had given Boomer enormous leeway to fashion a Marine plan. Now Boomer's superior was suggesting that the Marine commander in Saudi Arabia needed expert supervision.
 - Schwarzkopf had no intention of adding another layer to his command.
 During a break in the conversation, Schwarzkopf made a call to Boomer to ask if he was aware of Gray's proposal. He was not.
 - Schwarzkopf went back to his meeting with Gray and turned him down. The next day Gray asked Boomer what he needed and catalogued his request.
 - Gray settled for seeding the Marine force with some of his most promising colonels and young generals. For better or worse, Boomer would be the man to command them.
 - Time would prove that Boomer's understanding of the Iraqis had been accurate despite Gray's grousing.
- After months of jockeying and intrigue between the Marines and the Army, Boomer had finally secured a piece of the war plan and had the confidence of Schwarzkopf. But there was plenty of unfinished business. CENTCOM did not have a truly integrated plan.
 - There were three of them.
 - Buster Glosson developed the air campaign.
 - The Jedis refined the plans for the flanking attack against the Republican Guard.
 - Boomer was planning a thrust into the heart of Kuwait.
 - The parallel development of the air- and land-war plans also meant that some long-standing differences between the Services were sidestepped.
 - o How long should the air campaign run before the land offensive was launched?
 - o How much destruction could air strikes do to the Republican Guard?
 - o Could there be an air war without a ground war?
 - o Could Iraq do anything to frustrate the strategy?

The Generals' War: Chapter 9, "The Mailed Fist"

- Gen Powell's overall philosophy was that "overwhelming force" must be used to evict the Iraqis from Kuwait.
 - He believed airpower alone would not defeat Iraq and that ground power was necessary.
- However, Air Force Secretary Rice believed that airpower should be touted to persuade Iraq to leave Kuwait.
 - The Air Force was confronting a two-front war:
 - Preparing for war with Iraq.
 - Trying to outmaneuver two Army generals who commanded the allied war effort.

- Iraqi's strategy reflected a dim view of air power. Iraq believed that although the West had high-tech military weaponry and was good at bombing raids, it lacked the determination to pay the ultimate price of going to war.
 - Iraq's strategy was to ride out the air war and then use its large army to slug it out on the ground.
 - Secrecy, deception, and dispersion were Iraq's main tactics to counter the West's bombing strikes and drag out the war.
 - Iraq accomplished this by:
 - o Hiding its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs.
 - o Stripping command posts of computers and other vital gear.
 - o Dispersing Scuds from its production plant and moving mobile launchers to the desert.
 - o Iraq could not hide its troops. Its plan was simply to have soldiers dig in, endure the bombing and then come out when the ground war started.
- Rice believed that the Pentagon should:
 - Develop an air option, capitalizing on the use of long-range bombing and other aircraft
 - Treat the decisions to launch the air campaign and the ground war separately.
 - Decide to run the air war as long as it produced measurable results and it seemed possible that Iraq might give up.
 - O Buttressing his point, Rice told Cheney that Checkmate, the Air Force's Warplanning center, indicated that air strikes would be so effective against Iraq's army that Kuwaitis and the other Arab members of the coalition could reoccupy Kuwait by themselves. American ground forces could be held in reserve as a mailed fist, to be employed only if the Arab attack faltered.
- Col. Warden provided details of the following assessment to Cheney.
 - Using smart bombs, the air war would unfold in phases.
 - First phase was the strategic air campaign directed at undermining Saddam Hussein's regime.
 - o Knocking out Iraq's electricity.
 - o Shutting down its oil production.
 - o Scrambling its communications.
 - o Neutralizing its air defenses and its air force.
 - Laying waste to its program to build nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons..
 - If the strategic air campaign did not win the war, the second phase would be aimed at knocking out Iraq's air defense in Kuwait and southern Iraq so that allied war planes could bombard and shatter Iraq's troops at will.
 - O Warden estimated that it would take 8 days of concentrated bombing to destroy 50% of Iraq's artillery in Kuwait and 9 days to destroy 50% of its armor, which would be sufficient to defeat Iraq's army.
 - To impress skeptics, Warden asserted that if the weather was good, a much greater degree of destruction could be achieved in 15 days destroying 90% of Iraq's artillery and armor in Kuwait.

- Buster Glosson made a similar pitch to Schwarzkopf, although Schwarzkopf was not told that American troops massing in Saudi Arabia for the left hook should be considered as one big reserve force.
- Believing airpower was CENTCOM's best hope to hold down American casualties if and when the ground war was launched, Schwarzkopf made the goal a fundamental assumption of CENTCOM's plan. Tying air and land plans together, the OPLAN was not an open-ended bombing campaign that would bring about the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, but the Army's left hook.
- It was agreed that the air-war commanders would have first crack at Iraq and would mount a sustained campaign. However, it was unresolved as to what was the air campaign's main focus.

LESSON 6: INTRODUCTION TO FORCE DEPLOYMENT PLANNING AND EXECUTION (FDP&E)

Requirement 1

Objective 1. Explain the purpose of force deployment, planning, and execution. [JPME Area 1(d), 2(a), 4(a)]

Exam Item 20 applies.

Objective 2. Examine the major considerations for deployment planning and execution in support of a Joint force at the operational level of war. [JPME Area 3(a)(c), 4(c)(e)]

Exam Item 20 applies.

The following material pertains to both Objectives 1 and 2.

- The purpose of force deployment planning is to identify all forces necessary for accomplishing the combatant commander's concept of operations and to phase them into the theater of operations.
 - Is based on CJCS, Service, and USSOCCOM (for special operations) guidance and doctrine.
 - Both guidance and doctrine consist of force requirements determination, force list development and refinement in light of force availability, and force shortfall identification and resolution.
- FDP&P projects forces, which in turn project the military element of national power.
 - Military forces that are systematically and rapidly moved in response to requirements of war or military operations other than war (MOOTW).
- Operations to project the joint force encompass a range of processes shown below.
 - Planning for and execution of these processes normally occurs in a continuous, overlapping, and iterative sequence.

Processes for Projecting the Joint Force

Mobilization

Deployment

Employment

Sustainment

Redeployment

- Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies (MOOTW).
- Deployment is the movement of forces and their sustainment from their point of origin to a specific operational area to conduct joint operations outlined in a plan or order.
- Employment prescribes how to apply force and/or forces to attain specific national strategic objectives.
- Sustainment is directed toward providing and maintaining levels of personnel and materiel required to sustain the levels of combat or mission activity for the appropriate duration and at the desired level of intensity.
- Redeployment involves the transfer of units, individuals, or supplies deployed in one area to another, to another location within the area, to the zone of interior for the purpose of further employment, or to CONUS and/or OCONUS home and/or demobilization stations for the purpose of further operational employment or demobilization.

Requirement 2

Objective 3. Understand the purpose of each of the four phases of the Joint Deployment Process. [JPME Area 2(a), 3(e), 4(a)(b)]

Exam Item 21 applies.

- The joint deployment process involves four phases listed in the following graphic and briefly described below.



- Phase I: Predeployment activities.
 - o Analyze mission.
 - o Structure forces.
 - Validate deployment data.
 - o Prepare the force.
 - Schedule movement.
 - Assemble and marshal forces.
- Phase II: Movement to and activities at port of embarkation.
 - Two types of ports—
 - Sea ports of embarkation (SPOEs).
 - Aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs).
 - Arrival reporting.
 - Equipment sequencing.
 - POE inspections (customs, agricultural, etc.).
 - Load and lift reporting.
 - Departure reporting.

- Phase III: Movement to port of debarkation (POD).
 - Two types of PODs—
 - Sea ports of debarkation (SPODs).
 - Aerial ports of debarkation (APODs).
 - Movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment to PODs is conducted using common-user military and commercial assets that are part of the Defense Transportation System (DTS).
 - Common-user transportation is planned and executed by U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).
 - Strategic mobility triad used—
 - Airlift.
 - Sealift.
 - Prepositioned equipment and supplies (assets).
- Phase IV: Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI).
 - Is the responsibility of the supported combatant commander?
 - Deployment is not complete until the deploying unit is a functioning part of the joint force in theater.
 - o Reception.
 - Conduct POD operations.
 - Staging.
 - Prepare the force.
 - Assemble and marshal the forces.
 - Onward movement.
 - Cargo transfer operations at multiple nodes.
 - Integration.
 - Conduct tactical assembly area operations and integration operations.
 - Complete force integration.
 - JRSOI is the critical link between deployment and employment of joint forces in the area of responsibility (AOR) or joint operation area (JOA).
- The joint deployment process, Phase I through IV is summed up in the following graphic.



Objective 4. Develop an understanding of the Defense Transportation System. [JPME Area 1(a)]

Exam Item 22 applies.

- The DTS is that portion of the Nation's transportation infrastructure that supports Department of Defense common-user transportation needs across the range of military operations. It consists of those common-user military and commercial assets, services, and systems organic to, contracted for, or controlled by the Department of Defense.
- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) develops plans to promote and manage overall national policies, programs, procedures, and systems to meet essential civil and military transportation needs during national emergencies.
- USTRANSCOM provides global transportation management, employing an integrated transportation system across the range of military operations through its TCCs listed below.
 - Air Mobility Command (AMC):
 - U.S. Air Force command.
 - Provides common-user and exclusive-use airlift, air refueling, and aeromedical evacuation services for deploying, employing, sustaining, and redeploying U.S. forces wherever they are needed worldwide.
 - Military Sealift Command (MSC):
 - o U.S. Navy command.

- Provides common-user and exclusive-use sealift transportation services to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy U.S. forces around the globe between seaports of embarkation (SPOEs) and seaports of debarkation (SPODs).
- Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC):
 - U.S. Army command.
 - Provides common-user ocean terminal, commercial ocean liner services to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy U.S. forces on a global basis.
 - o Currently renamed: Service Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC).
- Reserve components.
 - Roughly one half of TRANSCOM's organic capability comes from the Reserve component (RC).
- Commercial partners.
 - Civil Reserve Fleet (CRAF).
 - Composed of commercial aircraft committed to support the movement of military forces and materiel worldwide.
 - CRAF contributes about one half of TRANSCOM's wartime airlift capability.
 - Activated incrementally in three stages.
 - o Stage I: Committed Airlift Expansion (Regional Crisis).
 - o Stage II: Defense Airlift Emergency (Major Theater War).
 - o Stage III: National Emergency.
 - Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA).
 - An intermodal, capacity-oriented program vice a ship-by-ship oriented program.
 - Provides contractually committed, time-phased, U.S. flag sealift capability to meet DOD contingencies.
 - o Contingency Response Program (CORE).
 - Voluntary program.
 - Provides DOD commercial transportation service support and priority for commercial transportation prior to and during contingencies and mobilization.
 - CORE network has 17 industry associations and 12 governmental agencies to be used during times of crisis or national emergency.
- TRANSCOM is the single port manager (SPM) for DOD.

Objective 5. Comprehend the roles and responsibilities of the Marine Corps component commander and his staff during force deployment planning and execution. [JPME Area 2(d), 3(a)]

Exam Item 23 applies.

- During deliberate or crisis action planning, the component commander is responsible for accomplishing the following tasks in support of deployment:

- Determines the force required to meet the combatant commander's requirement.
- Ensures that command relationships that maximize MAGTF capabilities are established.
- Provides planning guidance and letters of instruction to the MAGTF, supporting establishment, and Marine Corps Forces Reserve as needed to guide deployment and sustainment planning.
- Registers all force and sustainment requirements in the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD).
- Fills or sources sustainment requirements.
- Fills or sources force and sustainment shortfalls.
- Monitors the task organization and deployment preparations of the force and sustainment.
- Coordinates CONUS and overseas bases and stations deployment support to the MAGTF.
- Arranges for interservice and host-nation support agreements.
- Integrates deployment planning information with the combatant commander's plan for deployment and employment of the joint force.
- Develops necessary supporting plans and orders.
- During deliberate or crisis action planning, the Marine Corps component commander, MAGTF commander, and their staffs accomplish the following tasks in support of deployment:
 - Determine the task organization of the force required to accomplish the mission.
 - Develop a concept of deployment for the Marine Corps forces that supports force closure and employment.
 - Provide planning guidance and letters of instruction to the major subordinate commanders as needed to guide their deployment and sustainment planning.
 - Determine force shortfalls.
 - Determine sustainment requirements, shortfalls, and phasing.
 - Determine host nation or other Service support requirements.
 - Direct the preparation of embarkation and load plans.
 - Determine the phasing of the assigned forces.
 - Register all requirements in the TPFDD.
 - Develop a supporting plan or order as required.
 - Submit all requirements to the component commander.
 - Monitor execution of the deployment plan.
- The deployment plan is developed with the employment plan. To facilitate effective and efficient execution of the deployment, the MAGTF identifies requirements for support in the following:
 - Personnel.
 - Movement.
 - Medical.
 - Supply.
 - Services.
 - Maintenance of nondeploying equipment left in garrison.

- The MAGTF must have personnel, equipment, and supplies prepared at all times for deployment as an amphibious force and consider the implications on employment and deployment planning.
 - In particular, the MAGTF commander considers the:
 - Advantages/disadvantages of combat versus administrative loading of the ships to support the mission.
 - Potential degradation of specific combat skills that cannot be exercised while at sea for extended periods of time.
 - Advantages/disadvantages of deploying required sustainment with the force.
 - Potential degradation of equipment readiness due to the lack of use for extended periods of time.
 - Inherent flexibility in off-load methods available; e.g. boat, helicopter, air-cushioned landing craft, amphibious assault vehicle, and pier side.
 - Advantages/disadvantages of conducting a rehearsal of the tactical tasks assigned when time allows during the at sea transit period.
 - Advantage gained by not requiring a benign port or airfield for preparing for combat or assembling forces and their equipment.
- The MAGTF considers the implications MPF operations have on employment and deployment planning.
 - In particular, the MAGTF commander considers the:
 - Advantages for rapid deployment gained because the majority of the MAGTF's equipment, vehicles, and supplies are pre-positioned.
 - Speed with which personnel can be deployed via airlift.
 - Requirement for large staging areas for the integration of personnel and equipment.
 - Advantages in being able to incrementally off-load pier side or across a beach.
 - Flexibility in being able to incrementally build the size of a force and its combat capability based on the mission requirements.
 - Advantage in sustainability that the MPF provides to the MAGTF.
- The MEF commander considers the implications ACF operations have on employment and deployment planning.
 - In particular, he considers:
 - Advantages of the rapid deployment capability of the ACF.
 - Impact the requirement for rapid deployment has on readiness.
 - The requirement to prepare all of the ACF's organic equipment for deployment with personnel.
 - The limited self-sustainment capability until link up with other forces, such as MPF.
 - The requirement for augmenting or sustaining the ACF for an extended period of time.
 - The potential movement and resupply difficulties the ACF will encounter if the arrival airfield is a great distance from the AO.
 - The requirement to self-deploy the ACE of the ACF.

LESSON 7: INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS


Requirement 1

Objective 1. Understand how the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) Loop Model and the Information Hierarchy relate to information operations (IO). [JPME Area 2(d)]

Exam Item 24 applies.

- The observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop applies to any two-sided conflict.
 - It is a continuous, cyclical process.
 - The faster our loop spins in relationship to the adversary's, the better command and control tempo we retain over that adversary.
 - Rapid action is not the goal but meaningful action.
 - IO should be focused on disrupting the adversary's OODA loop in some way causing command and control to breakdown or become problematic for the adversary.
- The Information Hierarchy is comprised of four classes of information (See following graphic).
 - Raw data comprise the lowest class of information and include raw signals picked up by a senor of any kind (human or mechanical) or communicated between any kind of node within a system.
 - This class of information is rarely of much use until transformed in some way to give it some sort of meaning.
 - The next class is data that have been processed into or have been displayed in a form that is understandable to the people who must use them. (**Processed data =Information**)
 - More useful than raw data.
 - Raw data is *processed* into information.
 - The third class is **knowledge**—data that have been analyzed to provide meaning and value
 - Knowledge is data which have been evaluated as to reliability, relevance, and importance.
 - At this level the product is beginning to be useful for decisionmaking.
 - Information or processed data is turned into knowledge through the process of *cognition*—the act of learning what something means.
 - The highest class of information is **understanding**—knowledge that has been synthesized and applied to a specific situation to gain a deeper level of awareness of that situation.
 - We attempt to make understanding the basis for our decisions—although recognizing we will rarely be able to gain full understanding.

• We transform the complex components of knowledge into understanding through judgment, a purely human skill based on experience and intuition.



Information Hierarchy

- It takes a certain amount of time and effort for the commander to make the integrations between several bits of raw data and his level of understanding of a certain situation.
- When applying IO, one must look at the Information Hierarchy to determine which level the IO effort affects.
 - o If IO only focuses on the lower end of the hierarchy, such as raw data, then one must expect to achieve less effect on decisionmaking.
 - o In order to affect the knowledge and/or understanding levels of the hierarchy, coherent and consistent application of IO will be critical to ensure believability and effectively cloud the adversary's mental image and situational awareness.
 - The ultimate goal is to negatively affect the adversary's decision- making.
- Certain variables that affect an adversary's ability to understand is outside our sphere of influence.


- We cannot change the decision-maker's intellectual ability, his education, his experiences, or the cultural and religious influences that affect how he thinks.
- There are serious limitations to IO
- During the air war over Serbia, Milosevic attempted to divide the NATO alliance by waging a propaganda war.
 - Can be interpreted as IO focused on affecting the understanding of the civilian populace of NATO and the world as to what was truly occurring in Serbia.
 - NATO's attempts t respond quickly achieved mixed results.
- NATO was effective in using IO at the tactical level.
 - Jamming, lethal attacks, and special technical operations rendered Serbian air defenses impotent.
 - NATO struck Serbian key communications nodes in an attempt to weaken Serbian command and control.
 - IO actions at the operational and tactical levels must be coordinated within the joint commander's targeting process.

Objective 2. Understand the basic doctrine and planning considerations associated with IO at the operational level of war. [JPME Area 2(a), 4(e), 5(a)(b)(c)(d)]

Exam Item 24 applies.

- IO involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems.
- IO comes in two forms, offensive and defensive.
- IO and the strategic level of war.
 - May be included in the spectrum of activities directed by the President or Secretary of Defense to achieve national objectives by influencing or affecting all elements of national power while protecting similar friendly elements.
- IO and the operational level of war.
 - IOs are conducted to achieve or support campaign or major operation objectives.
 - Focus is on affecting lines of communication (LOCs), logistics, command and control, and related capabilities and activities while protecting similar friendly capabilities and activities.
- IO focuses on the vulnerabilities and opportunities presented by the increasing reliance on information and information systems.

- Combatant commanders are directed to incorporated offensive and defensive IO into deliberate and crisis action planning to accomplish their assigned missions.
- IO responsibilities are discussed in JP 3-13 pages I-6 through I-9.
- An IO threat is an adversary that is organized, resourced, and politically sponsored/motivated to affect decisionmakers.
 - Hackers, criminals and organized crime, insiders, industrial and economic espionage, and terrorism constitute a general threat to the protected information environment.
- Examples of IO targets are listed in the following graphic.



- Listed below are IO terms and doctrinal definitions:

• Information:

- o Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form.
- The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation.
- **Information operations:** Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems.

- **Information superiority:** That degree of dominance in the information domain, which permits the conduct of operations without effective opposition.
- **Information system:** The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information.
- **Information assurance:** Information operations that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.
- Computer network attack (CNA): Operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. Electronic attack (EA) can be used against a computer, but it is not computer network attack (CNA). CNA relies on the data stream to execute the attack while EA relies on the electromagnetic spectrum. An example of the two operations is the following: sending a code or instruction to a central processing unit that causes the computer to short out the power supply is CNA. Using an electromagnetic pulse device to destroy a computer's electronics and causing the same result is EA.
- Computer network defense (CND): Defensive measures to protect and defend information, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction.
- **Psychological operations (PSYOP):** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.
- **Electronic warfare (EW):** Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.
- Military deception: Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military
 decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby
 causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the
 accomplishment of the friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are as
 follows.
 - Strategic military deception.
 - o Operational military deception.
 - o Tactical military deception.
 - Service military deception.
 - Military deception in support of operations security.

- Operations security (OPSEC): A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:
 - Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.
 - Determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.
 - Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.

Objective 3. Understand the basic doctrine and planning considerations associated with offensive IO at the operational level of war. [JPME Area 2(a), 4(e), 5(a)(b)(c)(d)]

Exam Item 25 applies.

- Offensive IO is conducted across the range of military operations at every level of war to achieve mission objectives.
- JP 1-02 defines offensive IO as the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect adversary decision makers to achieve or promote specific objectives.
 - These capabilities and activities include but are not limited to (for detailed description, see JP 3-13 pages II-3 through II-6):
 - o Operations security.
 - Military deception.
 - Psychological operations.
 - o Electronic warfare.
 - Physical attack and/or destruction.
 - Special information operations.
 - Computer network attack.
 - Other activities that may contribute to offensive IO include but are not limited to:
 - Public affairs.
 - Expedites the flow of accurate and timely information.
 - Creates an awareness of the military goals.
 - Satisfies internal and external audiences by keeping them informed about the campaign and significant developments affecting them.
 - Provide joint force information to adversaries and/or potential adversaries when it is to our advantage.
 - o Civil affairs.
 - Establishes and maintains relationships.
 - Improves relations.
 - Mutually supportive with PSYOP forces in civil military operations (CMO).

- There are several principles to consider when planning offensive IO. They are listed below.
 - The ultimate targets are the human decisionmaking processes.
 - Objectives must be clearly established, support overall national and military objectives, and include identifiable indicators of success.
 - Selection and employment of specific offensive capabilities against an adversary must be appropriate to the situation and consistent with U.S. objectives.
 - IO must be thoroughly integrated, coordinated, and deconflicted with all other aspects and elements of the supported campaign or operation.
 - Understand the adversary or potential adversary's perspective and how it may be influenced.
 - Identify information systems value, use, flow of information, and vulnerabilities.
 - Identify targets to achieve IO objectives.
 - Predict the consequences of employing specific capabilities with a predetermined level of confidence.
 - Obtain necessary approval to employ IO.
 - Identify intelligence and combat information feedback necessary to support assessment.
 - Evaluate the outcome of specific IO to the predetermined level of confidence.
- Offensive IO may not take place in the same physical battlespace or be conducted in the same time frame as the combat operations they support.
- Offensive IO at the operational level of war:
 - Conducted by the combatant commander within the assigned AOR.
 - May have strategic value.
 - May be conducted during peacetime, in MOOTW, or during crisis and conflict.
- The following is a list of important IO planning considerations.
 - IO planning usually requires long-term development and must often consider peacetime circumstances and situations to be effective.
 - Establishing the organization of subordinate forces and designating command relationships in order to achieve IO unity of effort is especially important. This effort will usually require interagency agreement on synchronization, coordination, and deconfliction of the IO execution phase.
 - Planners will be required to identify Service, Joint, and interagency IO capabilities early on in order to provide the JFC with a "tool box" approach to developing his plan.
 - Identifying the adversary's strategic and operational IO centers of gravity (COG) is critical. However, because the IO portion of the IPB differs from the other, more traditional parts, planners should expect greater lead times and expanded collection requirements to identify these COGs.
 - Adherence to a common level of protection throughout the command structure is an essential yet obviously monumental task. Determining the scope of what needs to be

protected and the standards for how much protection is required is a huge challenge for the JFC and his staff.

- Intelligence in support of offensive IO.
 - Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) can have a profound effect on how the commander and his staff view adversary information and information systems.
- Offensive IO can be used against all elements of national power by targeting the following:
 - Human decision process (human factors).
 - Information and information systems used to support decisionmaking (links).
 - Information and information systems used to process information and implement decisionmaking (nodes).

Requirement 3

Objective 4. Understand the basic doctrine and planning considerations associated with defensive IO at the operational level of war. [JPME Area 2(a), 4(e), 5(a)(b)(c)(d)]

Exam Item 25 applies.

- Defensive IO is the integration and coordination of policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend information and information systems.
 - Defensive information operations are conducted through the following (for detailed description, see JP 3-13 pages III-4 through III-7):
 - o Information assurance.
 - o Information security.
 - Physical security.
 - Operations security.
 - o Counter-deception.
 - o Counter-psychological operations.
 - o Counterintelligence.
 - Electronic warfare
 - Special information operations.
 - Computer network defense.
 - Defensive information operations ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information access while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes.
- Just as offensive IO, defensive IO requires close coordination and cooperation between military and nonmilitary organizations internal and external to the supported JFC, at all levels of war.

- Defensive IO protects the information environment.
 - Defining joint force needs and dependencies is the focus of protecting the information environment.
 - Information environment includes any information medium or form, including, hard copy (message, letter, FAX), electronic, magnetic, video, imagery, voice, telegraph, computer, and hum.
 - The protected information environment is a combination of information systems and facilities.
 - The protected environment is rooted in a sound approach to managing risk.
 - Includes planning for both protection and response.
- Timely IO attack detection and reporting are the keys to initiating capability restoration and attack response.
 - Elements of IO attack detection include, but are not limited to, the following:
 - Service Information Warfare Centers.
 - Information system developers.
 - Information system providers and system administrators.
 - o Information and information systems users.
 - o Law enforcement.
 - o Intelligence.
 - Reporting structure.
 - IO response involves identifying actors and their intent and establishing cause and complicity.
 - Elements of IO response may include national-strategic decisions to apply flexible deterrent options (FDOs).
 - Possible response options are:
 - Law enforcement by investigation and eventual apprehension of criminals.
 - Diplomatic actions.
 - Economic sanctions.
 - Military force.

Objective 5. Comprehend the Marine Corps concept of IO and understand how it relates to Joint doctrine. [JPME Area 2(d)]

Exam Item 26 applies.

- According to the Marine Corps concept of IO, IO can be used to influence peacetime periods by, deterring during pre-crisis, enabling during crisis, and restoring during post-crisis across the spectrum of diplomatic, economic, military, and social elements of national power.

 IO conducted by MAGTFs will consist primarily of the following and any other informationoriented activity that the MAGTF can leverage to better facilitate the application of combat power.

• Battlespace Shaping.

- Ouring crisis, MAGTF-shaping operations must be linked to U.S. strategic objectives and must be consistent with ongoing regional engagement activities.
- Ouring shaping operations, it must be recognized that the targeting means is secondary to achieving the desired targeting effect, especially since "targets" in IO terms will no longer reside solely in the physical domain but will include the perceptions and actions of civilians, key leaders, and our military foes.

• Force Enhancement.

- In many ways, the ability to obtain timely and accurate information has emerged as a critical aspect of command, control, strategic agility, and operational maneuver.
- Ouring conflict, the MAGTF may rely heavily on electronic warfare, military deception, influence operations, and physical destruction to attack command and control, intelligence, and other critical information-based processes that directly impact an adversary's ability to conduct military operations.
- Capabilities outside the Marine Corps include computer network attack, psychological operations, and the means to manage media attention on the operation.

• Force Protection.

- The MAGTF commander will depend on information to plan operations and employ his forces.
- Information systems enable and enhance warfighting capabilities; however, our increased dependence on these rapidly evolving technologies will create new vulnerabilities.
- The integration of protection, detection, and reaction capabilities is needed to mitigate the effects of enemy action and environmental effects.
- Defensive IO encompasses four interrelated processes:
- o Information environment protection.
- Attack detection.
- Capability restoration.
- Attack response..
- IO will complement the Marine Corps' pursuit of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) aims by enhancing operational maneuver and force protection, by expanding knowledge and understanding of the environment and its cultures, and by providing the means to extend the influence of the MAGTF well beyond the range of its weapons systems.